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Abstract 
Culture affects accounting rules and practices. Dividend distribution influences corporate operating decisions, and a 
previous year’s dividends represent an earnings threshold. This study collected various countries’ data from 2004 to 
2014 from the COMPUSTAT database and analyzed how cultural factors influence the management of income to 
achieve a dividend threshold (i.e., desired earnings goal). Prospect theory reported that managers making decisions 
focus on the value from gains or losses with a certain reference point rather than the levels of wealth. The empirical 
results show that managers of listed firms in societies that exhibit uncertainty-avoidance, individualistic, power-distance, 
and masculinity meet or exceed dividend thresholds, whereas those in long term orientation societies do not. These 
findings emphasize the strong and direct effect of cultural values on meeting or exceeding dividend thresholds through 
earnings management over multiple years. In addition, our empirical results suggest that investors evaluate firm 
performance (i.e., earnings) before dividends are paid, which should be considered by financial market participants and 
regulators when assessing financial statements and the reliability of financial reporting among multiple countries. We 
only used a modified Jones model to measure earnings management. Therefore, tradeoff tools (i.e., real activities or 
other DA models) should be used to examine earnings management among managers to ensure the robustness of future 
studies. 
Keywords: dividend thresholds, earnings management, culture 
1. Introduction 
Earnings management is subjective, because managers can adjust financial reports and structure transactions to mislead 
stakeholders regarding the (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Empirical results have suggested that to satisfy stakeholders, 
firms conduct evaluations to determine whether earnings thresholds, such as change in earnings above zero (Heidarpoor 
et al., 2014), positive earnings (Sun and Rath, 2012), and analyst forecasts (Athanasakou et al.2011), as well as dividend 
thresholds are met (Daniel et al.2008；Liu and Espahbodi, 2014; Dechow et al. 2010b; Koren and Valentincic, 2013). 
Managers appear willing to expend considerable effort in avoiding dividend cuts (Lintner, 1956), because dividends are 
crucial to investors (Deangelo and DeAngelo, 2006a). Furthermore, the importance of pay-out policies for firms (as 
signaling mechanisms, for clients, and for tax-induced decisions) and firms’ economic environment indicates that 
pay-out threshold analysis is critical (Koren and Valentincic, 2013).  
The culture in which a corporation operates may influence its ethical behavior (Zhang et al. 2013) as well as its 
accounting rules and practices (Han et al. 2010). Previous studies have determined that earnings management among 
various countries were attributed to cultural factors, demonstrating that culture influences earnings management 
(Doupnik, 2008; Callen et al. 2011; Zhang et al. 2013; Kanagaretnam et al. 2011; Doupnik and Tsakumis, 2004). 
Cross-country differences in firms‘ propensity to pay dividends and level of dividend payments are also likely to be 
affected by differences in national culture that may influence excessive earnings retention or payment as dividends 
(Zheng and Ashraf, 2014; Bae et al.,2012; Ashraf,2014; Khambata & Liu.2005; Shao et al., 2009; Fidrmuc & Jacob, 
2010), however, these studies have been largely ignored, regardless of whether corporations’ earnings management 
resulted in meeting or exceeding dividend thresholds.  
In this study, we used dividend thresholds to measure earnings thresholds. Furthermore, we used power distance, 
individualism, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and long-term orientation to measure cultural dimensions. The 
purpose of this study was to clarify perceptions regarding the manipulation of income toward a desired earnings goal 
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(i.e., dividend threshold) and whether those perceptions are influenced by cultural factors.  
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Earnings Management 
Francoeur et al. (2012) manipulated earnings through discretionary accruals (DAs) in he previous and current year 
involving merger and acquisition activities. Zhang and He (2013) determined that firms engage in earnings management 
through research and development expenditures. Chiu et al. (2013) reported that shared directors have more incentive to 
manage earnings when their position is related to accounting or leadership. Farrell et al. (2014) determined that firms 
that incur financing constraints are likely to engage in earnings management by using accrual-based and real activities. 
Degeorge et al. (2013) reported that in highly financially developed countries, firms with analyst coverage engage in 
less earnings management because this coverage mitigates monitoring costs. Karampinis and Hevas (2013) revealed 
that tax is significantly related to earnings management during the period before the adoption of the International 
Financial Reporting Standards. 
2.2 Earnings Thresholds  
Sun and Rath (2012) demonstrated that firms are likely to avoid negative earnings through earnings management by 
using DAs. Moreover, Heidarpoor et al. (2014) revealed that firms manage earnings to maintain a positive earnings 
change, and Athanasakou et al. (2011) indicated that firms manage earnings to achieve analyst thresholds.  
2.3 Culture and Dividend Thresholds 
Maintaining dividend thresholds is a critical role for managers; therefore, they tend to manage earnings to achieve this 
goal (Liu and Espahbodi, 2014; Dechow et al. 2010b; Koren and Valentincic, 2013；Bennet and Bradbury, 2007; 
Peterson and Whitworth, 2013). Uncertainty avoidance implies a preference for non-ambiguity, and it thus results in 
earnings management (Callen et al. 2011; Zhang et al. 2013; Guan and Pourjalali, 2010), which reduces the level of 
uncertainty (Callen et al. 2011; Zhang et al. 2013). Doupnik and Tsakumis (2004) also determined that earnings may be 
managed because managers intend to prevent unfavorable and unanticipated earnings, particularly in 
uncertainty-avoidance societies. Therefore, managers in such societies are likely to achieve dividend thresholds. We 
propose the following hypothesis: 
H1: Firms in higher uncertainty-avoidance societies are likely to achieve dividend benchmarks by manipulating 
earnings.  
Hofstede (1980, 2001) demonstrated that people in individualistic societies are often considered to be respectful and 
protect everyone’s rights, and they thus assert laws, rules, or regulations that protect people or their rights. 
Consequently, people in individualistic societies tend to comply with laws or rules. Therefore, individualistic societies 
exhibit a significantly negative relationship with earnings management (Desender et al. 2011; Callen et al. 2011; Zhang 
et al. 2013), because law enforcement is generally strong (Zhang et al. 2013), and accounting rules are stringent, 
particularly high-level regulatory monitoring, which impedes financial misreporting (Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai, 2007). 
Because managers in individualistic societies may not manage earnings, corporations in such societies are not likely to 
consider exceeding earnings thresholds (i.e., dividend thresholds) a major goal. We propose the following hypothesis:  
H2: firms are not likely to meet/beat dividend thresholds through earnings management in higher individualistic 
societies.  
Power distance describes the level of power (i.e., equality or inequality) between people who interact with one another. 
Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) asserted that accounting systems are a tool that can be used by a power holder to 
demonstrate a desired image. Accounting numbers are thus distorted to achieve desired images in these societies. Guan 
and Pourjalali (2010) as well as Kinnunen and Koskela (2003) demonstrated that societies characterized by high 
power-distance exhibit a significantly positive relationship with earnings management, because individuals accept 
human authority and inequality (Kinnunen and Koskela, 2003) and do not demand power equalization or justification 
for power inequalities (Guan and Pourjalali, 2010). Therefore, managers in high-power-distance societies are likely to 
manage earnings because outsiders accept power inequalities, and consequently, accounting numbers can be distorted, 
enabling managers to meet or exceed earnings thresholds (i.e., dividend thresholds). We propose the following 
hypothesis: 
H3: firms are likely to meet/beat dividend thresholds through earnings management in higher power-distance societies. 
Masculinity refers to the extent to which a country emphasizes traditional male characters such as male achievement, 
control, and power. Hofstede (1980) suggested that people in high-masculinity societies seek to obtain achievements by 
gaining wealth or other means. Guan and Pourjalali (2010) determined that masculinity is associated with earnings 
management because of its emphasis on visible achievement. Performance because of misreporting in financial 
statements (Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai, 2007; Guan and Pourjalali, 2010). Consequently, managers in high-masculinity 
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societies tend to frequently manage earnings, possibly enabling them to meet or exceed earnings thresholds (i.e., 
dividend thresholds).  We propose the following hypothesis: 
H4:firms are likely to meet/beat dividend thresholds through earnings management in higher masculinity societies. 
Long-term orientation refers to the level at which a country devotes to traditional or forward-thinking values during a 
long-term period. Howevert and Hofstede (2005) showed that managers in short-term orientation societies focus on 
only current earnings. Current profits are often accelerated by earnings management influenced by management 
decisions. Therefore, earnings management is less frequently implemented in long-term-oriented societies, indicating 
that firms in such societies are less likely to meet or exceed earnings thresholds (i.e., dividend thresholds) compared 
with those in short-term-oriented societies. We propose the following hypothesis: 
H5: firms are not likely to meet/beat dividend thresholds through earnings management in higher long-term-oriented 
societies. 
3. Methodology 
Data from 2004 to 2014 were collected from the COMPUSTAT database. We used the following variables and research 
model. 
3.1 Earnings Management  
Discretionary accruals (DA) are components of total accruals that are susceptible to manipulation by managers and have 
been used frequently as a proxy for earnings management in previous studies, where the value of it was adopted to 
measure DAs. (Dechow et al. 1995) 
………………………………. (1) 
where  represents the total accruals calculated as the continuing operating net profit minus the cash flow 
from operations for year t;  denotes the assets for year t-1;  is the change in sales for year t;  
is the change in account receivables for year t; and  is the gross fixed assets for year t. 
3.2 Dividend Thresholds 
Daniel et al. (2008) reported that “expected dividends” represent an earnings threshold, and a firm’s expected dividend 
is measured as the previous year’s cash dividend; pre-managed earnings can thus be expressed as the operating cash 
flow plus nondiscretionary total accruals minus preferred dividends. We defined dividend thresholds as being exceeded 
when managed earnings (pre-managed earnings plus discretionary total accruals) are higher than expected dividend 
payments. 
3.3 Cultural Dimensions 
We defined a country’s cultural orientation according to the scale of Hofstede et al. (2010). We determined that if a 
country’s cultural orientation score on this scale is lower than 50, then the country’s culture is relatively low; otherwise, 
the culture is high. These measures include scores for power distance, individualism, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, 
long-term orientation. Each country exhibited five cultural dimensions. We applied only the five cultural dimensions 
that were relevant in countries; thus, the sample size was 64 countries in this study (see Table 1) 
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Table 1. Culture dimensions of nations 
Country UA IND PD MAS LTO 
Argentina 86 46 49 56 20 
Australia 51 90 38 61 21 
Austria 70 55 11 79 60 
Bangladesh 60 20 80 55 47 
Belgium 94 75 65 54 82 
Brazil 76 38 69 49 44 
Bulgaria 85 30 70 40 69 
Canada 48 80 39 52 36 
Chile 86 23 63 28 31 
China 30 20 80 66 87 
Colombia 80 13 67 64 13 
Croatia 80 33 73 40 58 
Czech Rep 74 58 57 57 70 
Denmark 23 74 18 16 35 
El Salvador 94 19 66 40 20 
Estonia 60 60 40 30 82 
Finland 59 63 33 26 38 
France 86 71 68 43 63 
Germany 65 67 35 66 83 
Great Britain 35 89 35 66 51 
Greece 112 35 60 57 45 
Hong Kong 29 25 68 57 61 
Hungary 82 80 46 88 58 
India 40 48 77 56 51 
Indonesia 48 14 78 46 62 
Iran 59 41 58 43 14 
Ireland 35 70 28 68 24 
Israel 81 54 13 47 38 
Italy 75 76 50 70 61 
Japan 92 46 54 95 88 
Korea South 85 18 60 39 100 
Latvia 63 70 44 9 69 
Lithuania 65 60 42 19 82 
Luxembourg 70 60 40 50 64 
Malaysia 36 26 104 50 41 
Malta 96 59 56 47 47 
Mexico 82 30 81 69 24 
Morocco 68 46 70 53 14 
Netherlands 53 80 38 14 67 
New Zealand 49 79 22 58 33 
Norway 50 69 31 8 35 
Pakistan 70 14 55 50 50 
Peru 87 16 64 42 25 
Philippines 44 32 94 64 27 
Poland 93 60 68 64 38 
Portugal 104 27 63 31 28 
Romania 90 30 90 42 52 
Russia 95 39 93 36 81 
Serbia 92 25 86 43 52 
Singapore 8 20 74 48 72 
Slovak Rep 51 52 104 110 77 
Slovenia 88 27 71 19 49 
South Africa  49 65 49 63 34 
Spain 86 51 57 42 48 
Sweden 29 71 31 5 53 
Switzerland 58 68 34 70 74 
Taiwan 69 17 58 45 93 
Thailand 64 20 64 34 32 
Trinidad and Tobago 55 16 47 58 13 
Turkey 85 37 66 45 46 
U.S.A. 46 91 40 62 26 
Uruguay 100 36 61 38 26 
Venezuela 76 12 81 73 16 
Vietnam 30 20 70 40 57 
UA: uncertainty-avoidance, IND :individualism, PD :power-distance, MAS :masculinity, LTO :long-term orientation 
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3.4 Model 
We examined the frequency distribution of earnings by using the approach of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). We 
redefined distribution of earnings as the “managed earnings” minus the expected dividend payments scaled by the 
beginning-of-period market value of equity. 
3.5 Robustness Test 
The samples in this study include only data from the 1th to 99th percentiles as measures for the robustness test to 
minimize the impact of outliers 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
As shown in Table 2 (modified Jones model), the 1/1 −itTA coefficient was significantly negative, the 
1−
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coefficient was negative. These results revealed that total accruals were 
increased when companies possessed more assets; moreover, the change in sales was subtracted from the change in 
account receivables and divided by the lagged assets. However, total accruals decreased when companies obtained more 
gross fixed assets. As indicated in Table 3, the mean DA values (modified Jones model) were positive in societies 
characterized by power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation. Therefore, managers in these 
societies who conducted earnings management through DAs were considered income-increasing, performance-adjusted 
discretionary items (Chen et al. 2011)  
Furthermore, the magnitude values were higher for power distance and lower for uncertainty avoidance. In addition, the 
mean DA values (modified Jones model) were negative in societies that were characterized by individualism and 
masculinity. Therefore, managers in these societies who conducted earnings management through DAs were considered 
income-decreasing, performance-adjusted discretionary items (Chen et al. 2011). Furthermore, these magnitude values 
were higher for individualism and lower for masculinity. Overall, these empirical results showed that DAs (modified 
Jones model) had differing effectiveness of detecting earnings management in these five society types. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the estimated cross section of the modified Jones model 
Dependent Variable:  
1/1 −itTA  -0.315*** 
1−
Δ−Δ
it
itit
TA
ARSALES  0.299** 
1−it
it
TA
PPE  -0.224** 
F-value 17.832 
2R  0.517 
Sample 42828 
Notes: *** represent significance at the 1% level, two-tailed；** represent significance at the 5% level, 
two-tailed；* represent significance at the 10% level,  represents the total accruals calculated as the continuing 
operating net profit minus the cash flow from operations for year t;  denotes the assets for year t-1;  is 
the change in sales for year t;  is the change in account receivables for year t; and  is the gross fixed assets 
for year t.  
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the earnings management (discretionary accruals: modified Jones model): five 
dimensions of culture 
power distance 0.142 0.024 0.076 
individualism -0.087 0.026 -0.028 
uncertainty avoidance 0.028 -0.023 0.001 
masculinity -0.034 -0.076 -0.047 
long-term orientation 0.128 0.036 0.072 
4.2 Empirical Test 
We divided scaled earnings from -0.2 to +0.2 into intervals with a 0.005 width. Fig. 1 shows that managers in societies 
characterized by uncertainty avoidance tended to meet or exceed dividend thresholds through manipulating earnings by 
using a modified Jones model. This is illustrated in Panel B, which indicates a standardization difference between the 
negative value (-.3.71) to the left of zero and the positive value (5.47) to the right of zero, and this result is consistent 
with that of El- Sayed Ebaid (2012). Panel C also shows that the Z test resulted in a significant level and that DAs had 
the effect of significantly increasing the percentage of occurrences of meeting the dividends benchmark from 45.66% to 
63.31%, and this result is consistent with that of Gore et al. (2007). These results are consistent with H1. People in 
societies characterized by uncertainty-avoidance are threatened by uncertain situations. Therefore, reduced uncertainty 
may be engendered by earnings management, and this approach may be considered a mechanism. In other words, 
investors perceive that managers operate conservatively when they receive stable dividends, reducing the level of 
uncertainty (this is likely to be consistent with the bird-in-hand dividend theory). In societies characterized by 
uncertainty-avoidance, if an enterprise does not pay stable dividends, investors are reluctant to hold their stock. Hence, 
managers in these societies avoid engaging in earnings management through DAs (i.e., maintaining the value of 
dividends from the previous year) to satisfy investors.  
Fig. 2 shows that managers in societies characterized by individualistic tended to meet or exceed dividend thresholds 
through manipulating earnings by using a modified Jones model. This is illustrated in Panel B, which indicates a 
standardization difference between the negative value (-.3.07) to the left of zero and the positive value (3.28) to the 
right of zero, and this result is consistent with that of El- Sayed Ebaid (2012). Panel C also shows that the Z test resulted 
in a significant level and that DAs had the effect of significantly increasing the percentage of occurrences of meeting 
the dividends benchmark from 60.52% to 62.65%, and this result is consistent with that of Gore et al. (2007).. These 
results are not consistent with H2. In theory, highly individualistic societies are relatively transparent and competitive, 
and their legal and accounting rules are stringent. Therefore, people in individualistic cultures comply with the law, and 
the regulatory monitoring in such cultures impedes financial misreporting, causing a low adoption of earnings 
management. However, these results suggested that investors were still likely to obtain stable dividends. Furthermore, 
the percentages of observations that met and missed dividend targets before and after the management of earnings were 
approximately a non-difference. Therefore, we also conclude that investors are likely to prefer “gains on capital” to 
dividends in individualistic societies. Overall, whether dividends are an earnings threshold for managers, and whether 
managers may manage earnings through DAs to avoid cutting dividends, individualistic societies are difficult to 
analyze.  
Fig. 3 shows that managers in power-distance societies tend to meet or exceed dividend thresholds through 
manipulating earnings by using a modified Jones model. This is illustrated in Panel B, which indicates a standardization 
difference between the negative value (-.4.48) to the left of zero and the positive value (6.61) to the right of zero, and 
this result is consistent with that of El- Sayed Ebaid (2012).Panel C also shows that the Z test resulted in a significant 
level and that DAs had the effect of significantly increasing the percentage of occurrences of meeting the dividends 
benchmark from 40.61% to 63.40%, and this result is consistent with that of Gore et al. (2007). These results are 
consistent with H3. In high-power-distance societies, power equalization is low. Consequently, managers assuming top 
power positions use accounting systems as a tool to demonstrate a desired image, and they can distort accounting 
numbers to achieve earnings management. Most of our sample members (26 of 41) are from emerging countries in 
which ownership concentrations are higher than those in developed countries, showing that power inequalities are 
higher and individuals accept human authority and inequality. Hence, to achieve the desired image, managers avoid 
reducing dividends by distorting accounting numbers through earnings management. 
Fig. 4 shows that managers in societies characterized by masculinity tend tended to meet or exceed dividend thresholds 
through manipulating earnings by using a modified Jones model. This is illustrated in Panel B, which indicates a 
standardization difference between the negative value (-.3.89) to the left of zero and the positive value (6.64) to the 
right of zero, and this result is consistent with that of El- Sayed Ebaid (2012). Panel C also shows that the Z test resulted 
in a significant level and that DAs had the effect of significantly increasing the percentage of occurrences of meeting 
the dividends benchmark from 40.11% to 61.98% , and this result is consistent with that of Gore et al. (2007). These 
results are consistent with H4. The accounting systems in societies characterized by high masculinity emphasize the 
Applied Economics and Finance                                          Vol. 4, No. 3; 2017 
7 
 
achievement of financial goals or performance. Therefore, managers tend to manage earnings more frequently to 
enhance their egos and achieve goals in these societies. Dividends are likely a benchmark for investors in societies 
characterized by high masculinity, because they signify enterprise performance. Therefore, managers provide stable 
dividends for investors by managing earnings above dividend thresholds to avoid negatively portraying company 
performance and attract investors. 
Fig. 5 shows that managers tend not to meet or exceed dividend thresholds in long-term-oriented societies, although 
Panel B indicates a standardization difference between the negative value (-.0.32) to the left of zero and the positive 
value (1.97) to the right of zero. However, this absolute value is not greater than 2.33, and this result is not consistent 
with that of Amar and Abaoub (2010). Furthermore, as shown in Panel C, the Z test resulted in a non-significant level, 
and DAs were associated with a significant reduction in meeting the dividend benchmark from 37.11% to 36.69%., and 
this result is consistent with that of Gore et al. (2007). These results are consistent with H5. because 
long-term-orientation societies focus on only forward-thinking values during a long-term period; short-term goals such 
as earnings are thus likely to be the major objective of firms operating in such societies. Hence, earnings management 
may not be used and dividend thresholds may also not occur in long-term-oriented societies.  
Overall, numerous managers of listed firms meet or exceed dividend thresholds in four types of societies (excluding 
long-term-oriented societies). Furthermore, the percentage of occurrences of meeting or exceeding dividend thresholds 
through manipulating earnings by using a modified Jones model was higher in societies characterized by power distance 
(63.40%). The change in the proportion of meeting or exceeding dividend thresholds through pre-managed earnings and 
manipulated earnings by using a modified Jones model was also higher in these societies. Moreover, Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) presented prospect theory and reported that managers making decisions focus on the value from gains 
or losses with a certain reference point rather than the levels of wealth. Therefore, our study supports the notion that 
expected dividend levels is a measure of earnings benchmarks. Furthermore, empirical solutions may be considered to 
be consistent with this specific theory in four types of society. However, to avoid possible bias from extreme values, we 
used only samples containing data from the 5th to the 95th percentiles as measures for the robustness test, and the results 
show that most of them are consistent. To shorten the tables, we omit the solution. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of earnings for the culture dimensions of Uncertainty Avoidance (N=49847). 
Panel A: Histogram of dividend thresholds according to managed earnings level 
Panel B Distribution of managed earnings and pre-managed earnings relative to dividend targets 
 earnings level Pre-managed earnings level 
class –0.005< ≤0 0< ≤0.005 –0.005< ≤0 0< ≤0.005 
N 865 1221 1045 1084 
Std. Diff. -3.71 5.47 -0.02 1.99 
 
 
Frequency(%)
Interval widths
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Panel C Proportions of observations achieving and missing dividend targets before and after discretionary accruals  
 proportion Z P value 
Pre-managed earnings level > 0 45.66% 121.12 0.000 
managed earnings level > 0 63.31%
0<pre-managed earnings level≤0.005  
0<managed earnings level≤0.005 
2.18% 9.02 0.000 
2.45%
-0.005<pre-managed earnings level≤0 
-0.005<managed earnings level≤0 
2.10%
1.74% 
-13.03 0.000 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of earnings for the culture dimensions of individualism (N=43987) 
Panel A: Histogram of dividend thresholds according to managed earnings level 
Panel B Distribution of managed earnings and pre-managed earnings relative to dividend targets 
 earnings level pre-managed earnings level 
class –0.005< ≤0 0< ≤0.005 –0.005< ≤0 0< ≤0.005 
N 790 1020 871 952 
Std. Diff. -3.07 3.28 -0.38 0.06 
Panel C Proportions of observations achieving and missing dividends targets before and after discretionary accruals  
 proportion Z P value
pre-managed earnings level>0 60.52% 4.02 0.000
managed earnings level>0 62.65%
0<pre-managed earnings level≤0.005  
0<managed earnings level≤0.005 
2.16% 1.68 0.093
2.32%
-0.005<pre-managed earnings level≤0 
-0.005<managed earnings level≤0 
1,98%
1.80%
-1.99 0.046
 
Frequency
Interval widths
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Figure 3. Distribution of earnings for the culture dimensions of power-distance (N=61965) 
Panel A: Histogram of dividends thresholds according to managed earnings level 
Panel B Distribution of managed earnings and pre-managed earnings relative to dividend targets 
 earnings level pre-managed earnings level 
class –0.005< ≤0 0< ≤0.005 –0.005< ≤0 0< ≤0.005 
N 982 1401 1242 1293 
Std. Diff. -4.48 6.61 -0.268 4.59 
Panel C Proportions of observations achieving and missing dividends targets before and after discretionary accruals  
 proportion Z P value 
pre-managed earnings level>0 40.61% 57.07 0.000 
managed earnings level>0 63.40%  
0<pre-managed earnings level≤0.005 
0<managed earnings level≤0.005 
2.08% 2.08 0.038 
2.26%
-0.005<pre-managed earnings level≤0 
-0.005<managed earnings level≤0 
2.04%
1.58% 
-5.51 0.000 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of earnings for the culture dimensions of masculinity (N=61996) 
Frequency(%) 
Interval widths
Frequency(%)
Interval widths
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Panel A: Histogram of dividends thresholds according to managed earnings level  
Panel B Distribution of managed earnings and pre-managed earnings relative to dividend targets 
 earnings level pre-managed earnings level 
class –0.005< ≤0 0< ≤0.005 –0.005< ≤0 0< ≤0.005 
N 1035 1489 1394 1270 
Std. Diff. -3.89 6.64 3.34 -0.91 
Panel C Proportions of observations achieving and missing dividends targets before and after discretionary 
accruals  
 proportion Z P value 
pre-managed earnings level>0 40.11% 55.19 0.00 
managed earnings level>0 61.98%   
0<pre-managed earnings level≤0.005  
0<managed earnings level≤0.005 
2.05% 6.044 0.00 
2.40% 
-0.005<pre-managed earnings level≤0 
-0.005<managed earnings level≤0 
2.24% 
1.67% 
-10.56 0.00 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of earnings for the culture dimensions of long-term-oriented (N=54298) 
Panel A: Histogram of dividends thresholds according to managed earnings level 
Panel B Distribution of managed earnings and pre-managed earnings relative to dividend targets 
 earnings level pre-managed earnings level 
class –0.005< ≤0 0< ≤0.005 –0.005< ≤0 0< ≤0.005 
N 1194 1335 1078 1147 
Std. Diff. -0.321 1.971 -0.062 1.754 
Panel C Proportions of observations achieving and missing dividends targets before and after discretionary accruals  
 proportion Z P value 
pre-managed earnings level>0 37.11% -1.11 0.267 
managed earnings level>0 36.69%
0<pre-managed earnings level≤0.005  
0<managed earnings level≤0.005 
1.72% 5.03 0.000 
2.14%
-0.005<pre-managed earnings level≤0 
-0.005<managed earnings level≤0 
1.85%
2.20%
4.01 0.000 
 
 
 
Frequency(%)
Interval widths
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5. Conclusion 
Accounting rules and practices are influenced by culture. Dividends influence corporate decisions, and expected 
dividends represent an earnings threshold. We analyzed the manipulation of income toward a dividend threshold in 
various countries and determined whether those perceptions are influenced by cultural factors. Data from 2004 to 2014 
were collected from the COMPUSTAT database. The empirical results show that managers of listed firms in societies 
characterized by uncertainty avoidance, individualism, power-distance and masculinity tend to meet or exceed dividend 
thresholds, whereas managers in long term orientation societies do not.  
These findings emphasize the strong and direct effect of cultural values on meeting or exceeding dividend thresholds 
through earnings management over multiple years. In addition, our empirical results suggest that investors evaluate firm 
performance (i.e., earnings) before dividends are paid, which should be considered by financial market participants and 
regulators when assessing financial statements and the reliability of financial reporting among multiple countries. 
However, this study has limitations. Dividends are almost always issued as cash dividends. However repurchases and 
stock dividends may also be issued. Therefore, net shareholder cash flow may not represent the overall dividend 
threshold, and researchers could stress the importance of firms’ pay-out components. In addition, future studies could 
investigate the effects of culture on achieving the earning expectations of analysts. We used a modified Jones model to 
measure earnings management. Therefore, tradeoff tools (i.e., real activities or other DA models) should be used to 
examine earnings management among managers to ensure the robustness of our results. Finally, because numerous 
countries have adopted international financial accounting standards as their accepted GAAP, future studies could use 
this information to explain systematic differences in earnings management that have resulted from cultural differences. 
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